Shared binary-start archival pass, 17 October 2026

Outcome
=======
No predictive construction of either start was found. Exact/partial hexadecimal
and decimal searches did not return a literal occurrence of either target.
This is a bounded negative search result, not proof that no public source exists.

The main new evidence is a concrete pre-2000 document lineage and the recovered
primary meeting minutes explaining its renaming. The earlier numeric pages are
still unavailable, so no claim that their generators match SEC2 v1 is justified.

Target values
=============
sect131r1/r2 shared start (125-bit integer):
0x10134db223421eb623422888a7879682
21367877431935133887761916126487352962

sect193r1/r2 shared start (182-bit integer):
0x23daf8a23206f9c4f299d7b21a9c369137f2c84ae1aa04
3434260857398502770843541148331161703622376847801690628

1. GEC 1 v0.5, September 1999: concrete earlier name and document
================================================================
Indexed original PDF:
https://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/document?doi=fe42ff586c6b5bd314cee6577221a2675319ed5e&repid=rep1&type=pdf

Search-index text identifies the title as GEC 1: Recommended Elliptic Curve
Domain Parameters, under Guidelines for Efficient Cryptography. It is a
September 1999 working draft, version 0.5, from Certicom Research. Front matter
lists Simon Blake-Wilson and Minghua Qu as contacts. This does not prove who
generated particular parameters.

The search index also returns printed page 24, which contains sect163r2 and the
opening of section 3.5, Recommended 193-bit Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters.
That section names sect193r1 and sect193r2. The indexed section introduction
has a repeated sect193r1 typo, followed by the correct two subsection names.
The target 131/193 numeric base-point pages were not retrieved.

The live PDF returned HTTP404 and Exa CRAWL_NOT_FOUND. Thus only indexed
excerpts were recovered, not a complete authenticated local PDF copy.
An older CiteSeer identifier is 10.1.1.524.9390:
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.524.9390
Its old download URL also returned404. A later paper cites it as SEC2 (1999),
which is less precise than the indexed original GEC1 title.

2. Recovered primary SECG minutes establish why GEC1 became SEC2
==============================================================
https://web.archive.org/web/20001102094425id_/http://www.secg.org:80/collateral/Minutes19990916Mtg.pdf
Local: sep1999-meeting-minutes.pdf and sep1999-meeting-minutes.txt
PDF SHA256: 2083510525d67d2b92c241ed1eb26e3a1df2a92ce5597d6928f3e6b448e78607

The minutes of the 16 September1999 meeting, hosted by NIST and submitted by
SECG chair Bill Lattin, record a review of the latest GEC1 draft. Requested
changes were to add large NIST curves, support field sizes above256bits for
AES, change table wording, and rename GEC1 to SEC2 to give it greater standing.
The next revision was expected in earlyOctober. No generator-generation
method or generator change is recorded. Silence in these short minutes does
not prove the generators remained unchanged.

A contemporary author-owned IETF draft cites SEC2 version0.6, October1999:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-blake-wilson-xmldsig-ecdsa-00
This confirms a specific intermediate version to seek, not its numeric contents.

3. Actual historical filenames and public discussion archive
==========================================================
Archived Oct1999 homepage:
https://web.archive.org/web/19991001225153id_/http://www.secg.org:80/
Local: oct1999-homepage.html
It advertises fresh SEC1/GEC1 drafts and directs review comments to
http://lists.certicom.com . The archived November2000 standards index names
collateral/sec2.pdf and collateral/sec2.ps, but labels those files version1.0:
https://web.archive.org/web/20001102154509id_/http://www.secg.org:80/secg_docs.htm
Local: nov2000-docs.html

A CDX listing of successful SECG captures through2001 contains240 records
including the header. PDF content types were sometimes recorded as 'unk', so
restricting archival searches to application/pdf missed the meeting minutes.
This is a concrete correction to the earlier negative PDF-only archive pass.

The original mailing list used Lyris. Its archived entry screen survives:
https://web.archive.org/web/20010429083508id_/http://lists.certicom.com:80/cgi-bin/lyris.pl?enter=secg-talk&text_mode=1&lang=english
Local: lyris-secg-apr2001.html
It offers a guest visit without joining, but the CDX list through2002 contains
entry/topic screens rather than substantive archived posts. No account was
created, no form submitted, and no email sent. The relevant historic discussion
archive remains an identifiable target rather than recovered evidence.

4. Earlier ANSI document: no target constants or predictive recipe
=================================================================
January8,1999 X9.63 working draft:
https://www.theswissbay.ch/pdf/man_doc/Software/ANSI/Cryptography_-_Key_Agreement_and_Key_Transport_Using_Elliptic_Curve_Cryptography.pdf
Local: x963-draft-1999.pdf and .txt, 132pages
PDF SHA256: c6fdf94592f4a5624ad8e3d0677164c629d73a2366c41b74fb0f40014c1a1f03

A.3.1 (printed50) selects a random R and multiplies by the cofactor. D.3.1
(printed91-92) retries with fresh random x rather than mandating x++. The
reviewed draft does not contain the six SEC target names or their intermediate
starts. Its generic recipe explains cofactor clearing but not the shared starts.

Simon Blake-Wilson's contemporary2000 X9.63 overview confirms that a list of
recommended parameters existed by then, but supplies no numeric origin recipe:
https://csrc.nist.gov/CSRC/media/Events/Key-Management-Workshop-2000/documents/x963_overview.pdf
Local: x963-overview-2000.pdf and .txt

The May26 and September13,1999 Additional ECC Groups For IKE drafts were also
recovered. They provide163/233/283-bit groups, not the target131/193 pairs:
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-ipsec-ike-ecc-groups-00.txt
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-ipsec-ike-ecc-groups-01.txt
Local: ike-ecc-groups-00.txt and ike-ecc-groups-01.txt
The September draft cites an August1999 GEC1 working draft. These citations
are earlier source pointers, not proof of the target numerical values.

5. Source-backed SHA1 clue handed to other workstreams
=====================================================
https://www.certicom.com/content/certicom/en/curves-list.html
The published ECC2-131 point seed is
B55555555554D696E67687561517586AA17BF3F4.
SHA1 of those20 raw bytes is
33255631db221deb61dc208ada4d88885a787969.
Its low131bits reproduce published U_x=01DB221DEB61DC208ADA4D88885A787969.
Some hex fragments resemble the SEC131 start, but there is no exact predictive
mapping established by this archival pass. The arithmetic/software workstreams
own transformation tests. A visible resemblance is not a provenance finding.

Useful remaining archival targets
================================
* A complete GEC1 v0.4/v0.5 or SEC2 v0.6 copy, especially numerical pages21-27
  and any generation notes. First test whether the basepoints match SEC2v1;
  only then use them as a holdout chronology constraint.
* The original secg-talk Lyris archive, particularly discussions of GEC1 around
  August-October1999. No substantive posts were recovered here.
* A source-linked implementation or original generation record. Personnel
  affiliations, draft contact names, and generic standard algorithms do not
  identify the actual constant-generation recipe.

Search accounting
=================
sources_reviewed: 152 (skill-defined sum of requested numResults across24 Exa
search calls, including irrelevant results). Supplemented with21 literal web
queries in6 batches and direct source/archive fetches. Exact Exa queries and
raw result records are preserved in search-results.json. Retrieval receipts
include URLs, byte counts and SHA256 hashes where a file was obtained.

This pass modified only work/secp-shared-archive and made no external writes.
